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INTRODUCTION

Three days prior to the 2009 Sugar Bowl, featuring sixthranked University of Utah versus fourth-ranked University of Ala* J.D./M.B.A., Fordham University School of Law and Graduate School of
Business Administration, New York, NY (2009); B.S., Sport Management, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA (2006). Chris Deubert is an attorney in New
York City and can be reached at cdeubert@gmail.com.
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bama, Alabama announced that its star left tackle Andre Smith was
suspended from the game due to having contact with an agent in
violation of team rules.' A few months later the Alabama Attorney
General's office stated Smith broke no laws in this situation.2 Smith
eventually hired thirty-year-old Alvin Keels, a single practitioner
firm, as his agent, whose clients list included cornerback DeAngelo
Hall and safety Gibril Wilson. After a troubling performance at the
February 2010 NFL Combine in which Smith appeared badly out of
shape, Smith fired the controversial Keels and hired attorney Rick
Smith of Priority Sports, a full-service firm with a strong reputation
since its inception in 1985.3
It was alleged that the reputable Rick Smith, hired three days
before the 2009 NFL Draft, was brought in to provide credibility to
the shaken draft status of Andre Smith, whose character was facing
serious questions.4 The move seemed to work, as Smith was chosen
as the sixth overall pick by the Cincinnati Bengals.5 Just weeks after
the draft, however, Andre Smith fired Rick Smith and rehired
Keels, despite the advice of Bengals' officials who advocated that he
remain with Rick Smith.' The Bengals' pleas failed and Priority
Sports issued a statement questioning Andre Smith's character.7
Did Keels do anything wrong? It is difficult to know. As the
saying goes, often times where there is smoke there is fire, and
1. See Tony Barnhart, Smith's Suspension Will Be Good for Alabama, ATLANTAJ. &
(Dec. 30, 2008, 8:23 AM), http://www.ajc.com/blogs/content/sharedblogs/ajc/cfb/entries/2008/1-2/30/smiths suspensi.html (discussing suspension
and outlook for Alabama).
2. See Gentry Estes, AG: No Agent Wrongdoing in Smith Case, HUNTSVILLE TIMEs,
June 11, 2009, at 5D (describing lack of probable cause to prosecute under Alabama Sports Agent statutes).
3. See Aaron Wilson, Andre Smith Back With Alvin Keels, (May 19, 2009, 8:50
PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2009/05/19/source-andre-smithback-with-alvin-keels/ (recounting reasons for Andre Smith's hiring of Rick
Smith); Priority Sports:About Us, PIuoRrlY SPORTS, http://www.prioritybasketball.
biz/football/aboutus.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (describing firm background and noting superior reputation of firm).
4. See Wilson, supra note 4 (explaining that Smith was suspended, bolted out
of combine without informing officials, and was out of shape for workout).
5. SeeJoe Reedy, Agents' Status Still in Flux, CINCINNATI ENQ., May 14, 2009, at
IC (adding that Smith was selected in first round draft by Cincinnati Bengals).
6. See Wilson, supra note 4 (explaining Smith's switch to Keels); Mike Florio,
Smith is Getting Pulled in Many Directions (May 13, 2009, 11:40 AM ET), http://
profootballtalk.nbcspo-rts.com/2009/05/13/andre-smith-is-getting-pulled-inmany-directions/ (commenting on Smith's controversial switch to Priority Sports).
7. See Mike Florio, Priority Sports Slams Andre Smith, PROFOOTBALLTALK.COM
(May 21, 2009, 2:42 PM ET), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2009/05/21/
priority-sports-slams-andre-smith/ (quoting Priority Sports' statement that Smith
was distracting to company and did not match character of clients Priority
represents).
CONST.
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there are athlete-agents walking all over the place surrounded by
smoldering black clouds. The unscrupulous conduct of agents has
been well documented, ranging from breaches of fiduciary duties,
fraud, conflicts of interests, unethical behavior, tortious interference with contractual relations and many more questionable activities.8 The Fall of 2010 provided a plethora of examples.9 Yet,
8. See, e.g., Lankford v. Irby, 2006 WL 2828548 (D.N.J. September 29, 2006)
(discussing breach of fiduciary duty); In re Ekuban, 2004 WL 1088340 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 2004) (discussing fraud and false representation); Hillard v. Black, 125
F.Supp. 2d 1071 (N.D. Fla. 2000) (discussing breach of fiduciary duty); Jones v.
Childers, 18 F.3d 874, 899 (11th Cir. 1994) (disussing fraud); Brown v. Woolf, 554
F. Supp. 1206 (S.D. Ind. 1983) (discussing fraud and breach of fiduciary duty); see
also Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n v. Glenn, 649 N.E.2d 1213 (Ohio 1995) (discussing fraud); Detroit Lions, Inc. v. Argovitz, 580 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Mich. 1984)
(discussing breach of fiduciary duty based on fraud and misrepresentation); Poston v. NFLPA, 2002 WL 31190142 (E.D.Va., August 26, 2002) (discussing violation
of agency rules); Steinberg, Moorad & Dunn, Inc. v. Dunn, 136 Fed. Appx. 6 (9th
Cir. 2005) (discussing contractual violations); Smith v. IMG Worldwide, Inc., 360
F.Supp. 2d 681 (E.D. Pa. 2005); Walters v. Fullwood, 675 F.Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (discussing breach of agency agreement). See Bryan Couch, How Agent Competition and CorruptionAffects Sports and the Athlete-Agent Relationship and What Can Be
Done to Control It, 10 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 111 (2000) (discussing negative effect
of agents' unfair competition); Liz Mullen, Brian Bosworth Files Suit Against NFL
Agent Gary Wichard (Apr. 29, 2010), www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/138611
(pointing out New York case involving breach of fiduciary duties); David S. Caudill,
Revisiting the Ethics of Representing ProfessionalAthletes: Agents, "Attorney-Agents, "FullService Agencies, and the Dream Team Model, 3 VA. SPORTs & ENT. L.J. 31 (2003) (discussing ethical practices in sport agency sector); Melissa Neiman, FairGame: Ethical
Considerations in Negotiations by Sports Agents, 9 TEX. REv. ENT. & SPORTs L. 123
(2007) (explaining that agent fees are often unethically high); Richard T. Karcher,
Solving Problems in the PlayerRepresentation Business: Unions Should Be The "Exclusive"
Representatives of the Players, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 737, 759 (2006) ("The agent
business is fraught with conflicts of interest at all sorts of levels"); Scott R. Rosner,
Conflicts of Interest and the Shifting Paradigmof Athlete Representation, 11 UCLA ENrT. L.
REv. 193 (2004) (listing situations in which conflicts of interest arise); Stacey B.
Evans, Sports Agents: Ethical Representatives or Overly Aggressive Adversaries?, 17 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 91 (2010) (writing about specific individuals who have shown
unethical conduct; Timothy Davis, Regulating the Athlete-Agent Industry: Intended and
Unintended Consequences, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 781 (2006) (stating that clients are
increasingly suing agents for tortious interference with contractual relations);
9. See Joe Schad & Pat Forde, Pouncey denies accepting money, ESPN.com (July
22, 2010, 12:23 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5398414 (recounting NCAA's investigation into allegations that Florida lineman Maurkice
Pouncey received $100,000 from agent while still playing at Florida). The NCAA
was concerned about whether Maurkice's twin brother, Mike, still a lineman at
Florida, may have also received improper benefits. See id. (noting both brothers
'provided phone, bank and credit card records that do not show any large payments"). See also Stewart Mandel, NCAA Turning up Heat on Agent-Player Relations
with More Probes, SPORTSlLLUSTRATED.COM (July 19, 2010), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.co-m/201 0/writers/stewart mandel/07/19/ncaa.agents/index.html
(outlining NCAA's investigation into whether several players from Universities of
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and Alabama may have improperly attended party hosted by agent in Miami); Ivan Maisel & Mark Schlabach, Dareas
May Have Attended Agent's Party, ESPN.COM, (July 22, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.
com/ncf/news/story?id=5396236 ("The NCAA is trying to determine who paid for
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despite what universities, legislators, coaches and the general public
might think, not all agents are engaged in immoral, impermissible
or illegal behavior.
While there are several layers of legislation and regulation for
athlete-agents, enforcement is severely lacking.10 Consequently,
agents that believe in carrying on their profession in an honest and
legal manner ("clean agents") are left at a significant competitive
disadvantage." Seemingly betrayed by the very schemes they willingly obey, this article will make the case for a cause of action by
agents against their preeminent regulator, the player unions.

In each of the "Big 4" sports leagues, the National Football
League ("NFL"), Major League Baseball ("MLB"), National Basketball Association ("NBA") and National Hockey League ("NHL"),
the players' transportation to Miami, and lodging, food and entertainment while
they were there."). Agent Gary Wichard was fingered for possible wrongdoing in
the investigations. See Mike Florio, NCAA Investigation Could Result in NFLPA Suspension of Wichard, PROFOOTBALLTALKCOM (Sept. 30, 2010, 6:37 PM ET), http://
profootballtalk.nbcsports.co-m/2010/09/30/ncaa-investigation-could-result-innflpa-suspension-of-wichard/ (noting Wichard's financial connections to players).
10. See Associated Press, Report: State Agent Laws Unenforced, ESPN.com (Aug.
17, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=5470067 (stating that
"more than half of 42 states with sports agent laws have yet to revoke or suspend a
single license, or invoke penalties of any sort). The Federal Trade Commission has
likewise never revoked a single license or invoked a penalty. See id. (adding that
Federal Trade Commission was granted authority to oversee state sports agents in
2004). See also Telephone interview with Robert Boland, Ass. Prof. of Sports Management, Preston Robert Tisch Center for Hospitality, Tourism, and Sports Management, New York University (Mar. 11, 2010) (claiming rules are "shield laws"
instead of enforcement acts). Professor Boland was formerly an NFLPA Certified
Contract Advisor and writes about the business of football for
www.nationalfootballpost.com. See also, Telephone interview with Robert H. Lattinville, Chairman, Sports Law Practice Group, Stinson Morrison Hecker LLP
(Mar. 11, 2010) (discussing lack of resources to properly enforce rules). Mr. Lattinville has been an NFLPA Certified Contract Advisor since 1990 and is also a
sports law professor. See also, Telephone interview with Eugene Parker, Maximum
Sports Management (Mar. 25, 2010) (condemning lack of informed player decisions). Mr. Parker is an NFLPA Certified Contract Advisor whose clients include
Hines Ward, Richard Seymour, Emmitt Smith, Larry Fitzgerald, Steven Jackson,
Michael Crabtree and Dez Bryant. See also, E-mail from Adam Paget, NHLPA Certified Player Agent, PuckAgency LLC (Mar. 30, 2010, 12:14 PM EDT) (on file with
author) (discussing lack of enforcement of agency rules); Telephone interview
with Joshua Golka, Attorney, Law Office ofJoshua P. Golka (Mar. 29, 2010) (attributing problem to lack of prosecution and investigation). Mr. Golka regularly represents agents, athletes and athletic organizations and is the creator and moderator
of Golka's Athlete Agent Regulation Blog.
11. Telephone interview with Robert Boland, supra note 10 (noting enforcement acts only solve narrow range of problems); Telephone interview with Robert
H. Lattinville, supra note 10 (emphasizing benefits of transparency in recruiting);
Telephone interview with Eugene Parker, supranote 10 (noting effects of lure and
excitement of business and potential financial gain); E-mail from Paget, supra
note 10 (describing competitive disadvantage agents claim to face); Telephone interview with Joshua Golka, supra note 10 (promoting agent self-regulation).
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there exists a corresponding players union or players association
("PA") that represents the players pursuant to labor law: the National Football League Players Association ("NFLPA"), Major
League Baseball Players Association ("MLBPA"), National Basketball Players Association ("NBPA") and National Hockey League
Players Association ("NHLPA"). While this article will consider the
agent industry as it applies to each of the "Big 4" leagues and unions, the focus will primarily be on the NFL and NFLPA, where
agent competition is arguably its fiercest: as of the 2010 NFL season, there were 773 agents certified by the NFLPA, but only 338
(43.7%) of them had clients.1 2
This article will first examine the current regulatory schemes
and the problems therein, and will be followed by an examination
of possible solutions to problems in the agent industry. Finally, this
article will conclude by explaining that private enforcement by
agents is necessary to prevent the further deterioration of the athlete-agent industry.
II.

CuRRE r AGENT REGULATION SCHEMES
A.

1.

State Legislation

Uniform Athlete Agents Act ("UAAA")

As of March 2010, the Uniform Athlete Agents Act ("UAAA")
has been adopted in thirty-nine states.1 3 The UAAA is, to each state
that has passed it, the primary piece of legislation in the regulation
and punishment of unscrupulous athlete-agents. In 1997, at the request of the NCAA and several major academic institutions, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL") agreed to draft a model law to be adopted by each
state which would regulate athlete-agents. 14 The legislation was first
12. See E-mail from Caitlin Reddinger, Administrative Assistant, Salary Cap &
Agent Administration, NFLPA (Mar. 23, 2010, 1:57 PM. EDT) (on file with author)
(noting number of certified agents); NFLPA Player-Agent Report (on file with
NFLPA) (discussing agent competition).
13. See NCAA, Latest News, Contact Informationfor States that Passed the Uniform
Athlete Agents Act (July 29, 2010), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/resources/late-st+news/ 2 01 0+news+stories/july+latest+news/contact+information+for+states+that+passed+the+uniform+athlete+agents+act#pa (listing
states that have passed UAAA and providing contact information for authority in
each state); Joshua Golka, GOLKA'S ATHLETE AGENT REGULATION BLOG, http://
www.gaarb.com/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2010) (noting adoption of UAAA).
14. See Kenneth L. Shropshire, NCAA Materials on Agents and NCAA-Regulated
Student-Athletes, SM009 A.L.I. - A.B.A. 121 (2007) (describing model law). The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) is a contingency of more than 300 legislators, judges, lawyers and professors (known as
commissioners) who "study and review the law of the states to determine which
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presented in the fall of 2000 and was quickly passed in several
states.' 5
Section 2 of the UAAA, Definitions, defines "athlete agent" as
"[a] n individual who enters into an agency contract with a studentathlete or, directly or indirectly, recruits or solicits a student-athlete
to enter into an agency contract."' 6 Agents, however, have the important task of reviewing each state statute, which may define an
athlete agent or student-athlete differently, and often more
broadly, than the UAAA. 1 7 Furthermore, one needs to recognize
that under these broad definitions, nearly everyone attempting to
create a professional relationship with an athlete may be considered an agent, including the largely unregulated and unknown
population of agent "runners."" The term "runner" generally describes someone employed by an agent, typically a young person,
whose job is to become friendly with the student-athlete, providing
the student-athlete with cash, meals, clothes or other gifts and ultimately steering the student-athlete towards the employing agent.19
Because runners operate in a shady world of independent contractual relationships, enforcement bodies face difficulties in tracking
runners down and associating them and their illegal actions with
specific agents. 20
Section 3 of the UAAA submits athlete agents to the jurisdiction of the state in which he or she is acting as an agent, and appoints the Secretary of State in that state as his or her agent for
service of process in related civil actions.2 1 What constitutes "acting" in the state is a personal jurisdiction issue outside the scope of
areas of law should be uniform." National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, UNIF. LAw COMMIssioN, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/

(last visited

Oct. 23, 2010). "The commissioners promote the principle of uniformity by drafting and proposing specific statutes in areas of the law where uniformity between
the states is desirable." Id.
15. See UNIF. ATHLETE AGENT's Acr

§

2(2) (2000), available at www.law.upenn.

edu/bll/arch-ives/ulc/uaaa/aaal130.htm [hereinafter UAAA] (defining athlete
agent).
16. Id. "The term includes an individual who represents to the public that the
individual is an athlete agent."Id.
17. See E-mail from Mike Powell, Managing Attorney, Office of the Texas Secretary of State, Athlete Agent Legislation Enforcement (Apr. 4, 2010, 12:22 p.m. EDT)
(on file with author) (noting differences between state statutes and UAAA).
18. Interview with Jared Fox, NFLPA Certified Contract Advisor, Sportstars,
Inc. (Apr. 13, 2010) (providing definition and purpose of "runners").
19. See id. (providing duties of "runners").
20. See id. (noting difficulties of prosecution).
21. See UAAA §3(a) (explaining procedures for agentjurisdiction and service
of process). The comment to Section 3 recognizes "that the appropriate state office to administer [the UAAA] may vary from State to State." Id. § 3 cmt.
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this article. 22 Important to the regulations of agent is knowing who
these agents are: Sections 4 through 9 require agents to register
with the Secretary of State, set the fees and conditions of registration and establish the right of the Secretary of State to deny, suspend, revoke or refuse to renew the agent's registration.2 3
Section 10 controls the form and content of the representation
contract agents sign with athletes, in particular student-athletes. 24
Notably, this section provides that every contract must contain the
following words as a "conspicuous notice in boldface type in capital
letters stating:"
WARNING TO STUDENT-ATHLETE
IF YOU SIGN THIS CONTRACT:
(1) YOU MAY LOSE YOUR ELIGIBILITY TO COMPETE
AS A STUDENT-ATHLETE IN YOUR SPORT;
(2) IF YOU HAVE AN ATHLETIC DIRECTOR, WITHIN
72 HOURS AFTER ENTERING INTO THIS CONTRACT,
OR BEFORE THE NEXT SCHEDULED ATHLETIC
EVENT IN WHICH YOU MAY PARTICIPATE, WHICHEVER OCCURS FIRST, BOTH YOU AND YOUR ATHLETE AGENT MUST NOTIFY YOUR ATHLETIC
DIRECTOR; AND
(3) YOU MAY CANCEL THIS CONTRACT WITHIN 14
DAYS AFTER SIGNING IT. CANCELLATION OF THIS
CONTRACT MAY NOT REINSTATE YOUR
ELIGIBILITY.2 5
Furthermore, Sections 11 and 12 require the agent to give notice to the educational institution within seventy-two hours and reiterates the athlete's right to cancel the contract. 26 Section 14 lists
Prohibited Acts, Section 15 provides for Criminal Penalties, and
Section 16 provides for a civil remedy by the academic institution
22. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Solano
County, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (holding exercise ofjurisdiction would be unreasonable due to burden and lack of sufficient state interests); see also Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958) (noting lack of personal jurisdiction); International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (holding proper assertion of in personam jurisdiction based on sufficient in-state interest).
23. See UAAA §§ 4-9 (describing requirements for agent athletes).
24. See id. § 10 (describing specifics of representation contracts).
25. Id.
26. See id. §§ 11-12 (reiterating agents' requirements and athletes' rights).
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against an agent should the institution incur any damages as a result of the agent's actions. 27
The UAAA states that its primary purpose "is to protect student-athletes and educational institutions from athlete agents who
engage in unsavory and, oftentimes, illegal practices."2 8 Although
the UAAA states that one of its purposes is to "provide a system that
allows states to honor the registration of athlete agents from states
with similar laws," there is no indication that the UAAA was passed
with any direct intention to protect clean agents in their profession. 29 Accordingly, if a state were to enact and effectively enforce
the UAAA, clean agents would be protected. The UAAA boasts of
its "strong penalties for violators" which would seem to effectuate
the primary goal of the legislation.30
On its face, the UAAA is the antidote for what ails the agency
industry. In practice, the UAAA has been toothless and ineffective. 3 ' Several, if not most of the sections of the UAAA are not complied with and not enforced. 3 2 Most agents have been forced to
register in each state they are "doing business," and Section 14 (b) 1
prohibits "initiat[ing] contact with a student-athlete unless registered under [the UAAA]."3 The regular practice of agents, however, includes recruitment of players in states where the agents are
not registered and do not register unless and until they believe they
are going to sign the player. 3 4
One reason agents do this is the failure of the only provision in
the UAAA meant to help agents, whereby states would "honor" the
registration of an agent in another state with similar legislation.
Presently, only Alabama, Arizona, Oregon, Pennsylvania and South
27. See id. §§ 14-16 (describing further sections of UAAA).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Telephone Interview with Boland, supra note 10 (noting agent's notions on UAAA); Telephone Interview with Lattinville, supra note 10 (detailing
Lattinville's theories on UAAA); Telephone Interview with Golka, supra note 10
(describing agents' thoughts on UAAA). See also, e-mail from Rick Karcher, Director, Florida Coastal School of Law Center for Law and Sports (Apr. 8, 2008, 10:41
AM EDT) (on file with author) (discussing Karcher's view on UAAA). See also Associated Press, supra note 11 (finding under-enforcement of state sports agency
laws).
32. See Telephone Interview with Boland, supra note 10 (discussing compliance and enforcement of UAAA); Telephone Interview with Lattinville, supranote
10 (addressing compliance and enforcement of UAAA); Telephone Interview with
Golka, supra note 10 (describing compliance and enforcement of UAAA).
33. UAAA § 14(b)1 (2000).
34. See Telephone Interview with Lattinville, supra note 10 (explaining regular
practice of agents).
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Dakota offer any kind of discount in registration for agents who
have previously registered with another state.35 With annual or biannual registration fees generally costing a few hundred dollars in
addition to expensive bonding requirements, states most likely see
agent registration as an easy revenue source and an effective way to
track and limit agents practicing in their respective states.3 6
Reciprocal registration is not the only issue where the states are
not sufficiently cooperating. The comment to Section 6 of the
UAAA states that Secretaries of State ought to "exchange information about [the] denial, suspension, revocation or refusal to renew
registration of athlete agents." 37 The stated purpose of such an exchange would be to "reduce the expense of administering [the] act
and provide for more effective enforcement."3 However, to date,
there is no agreement among the states to share information about
athlete agents. 3 9
Furthermore, pursuant to the UAAA, probably almost every
agent-athlete contract is voidable by the player. 40 Section 10(c) requires agents to give the conspicuous, boldface, capital letter statement copied above. 4 1 Section 10(d) states that if this provision is
not in the contract, the contract is then voidable by the studentathlete.4 2 As will be discussed in more detail below, each of the PAs
in the Big Four has regulations governing agent registration and
conduct.4 3 These regulations also provide a required standard
35. See Telephone Interview with Golka, supra note 10 (listing states that offer
discount).
36. See Telephone Interview with Boland, supra note 10 (discussing agent registration in states); Telephone Interview with Lattinville, supra note 10 (addressing registration of agents within states); Telephone Interview with Golka, supra
note 10 ((describing states' views of agent registration); Telephone Interview with
Golka, supra note 10 (noting state agent registration views). The actual fees for
each state can be viewed by visiting the website for each Secretary of State. See e.g.,
Florida Department of Business & Professional Regulation, Athlete Agent Licensure
Application, https://www.myfloridalicense.com/CheckListDetail.asp?SID=&xactCode=1030&clientCode=6001&XACT DEFNID=6183 (last visited Oct. 17, 2010)
(requiring $1,255 fee); Tennessee Department of State, Athlete Agent Licensing,
http://tenn-essee.gov/sos/sportsagent.htm (last visited Oct.11, 2010) (providing
link to athlete agent application, requiring filing fee of $500).
37. UAAA § 6 cmt.
38. Id.
39. See Email from Powell, supra note 17(describing lack of existing agreements between states).
40. See UAAA §10 (explaining student-athlete's ability to void contracts).
41. See id. (reviewing standard agreement).
42. See id. (expounding on student-athlete's right to void contracts).
43. See The NFLPA Regulations Governing Contract Advisors, NFL PtAYERs AssociATION, http://images.nflplayers.com/mediaResources/files/PDFs/SCAA/
NFLPA _Regulations ContractAdvisors.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (noting
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agreement to be used between the agent and the athlete. 44 None
of these standard agreements contain the language required by the
UAAA, yet an agent in violation of this provision would probably
argue that using the standard PA agreement is sufficient for satisfying the UAAA. While possible that agents execute side agreements
with the players to comply with the UAAA, this is highly unlikely.
2.

Other State Laws

California, Michigan and Ohio have not passed the UAAA but
have otherwise passed state laws designed to regulate athlete
agents. 4 5 These laws provide varying degrees of regulation, by listing prohibited conduct, possible penalties and, in the cases of California and Ohio, requirements of registration.4 6 In addition, states
are free to investigate and prosecute agents under criminal laws.
The most realistic crimes an agent might be charged with are bribery, embezzlement and criminal fraud.4 7 Criminal prosecutions of
athlete-agents, however have been rare. 48
that NBPA Regulations Governing Player Agents, MLBPA Regulations Governing
Player Agents and NHLPA Regulations Governing Player Agents [Hereinafter
NFLPA Regulations, NBPA Regulations, MLBPA Regulations and NHLPA Regulations]are not readily available). They can be obtained by contacting their offices
via their respective websites or through membership with the Sports Lawyers Association. See www.nbpa.com; mlbplayers.com; nhipa.com; www.sportslaw.org (setting forth contact information for Associations).
44. See id. (discussing various aspects of regulations governing agents).
45. See Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents Act, CA. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 1889518897.97 (1997) (noting states that have passed UAAA); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 750.411e (1988) (setting forth athlete agent regulations); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 4771.01-02 (1988) (setting forth athlete agent regulations); see also Robert P.
Baker, The Unintended Consequences of the Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents Act: DeprivingStudent Athletes of Effective Legal Representation,12 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 267 (2005) (contrasting California's law with UAAA).
46. See Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 1889518897.97 (noting California athlete regulation provisions); MICH. COMP. LAws
§ 750.411e (setting forth Michigan regulations); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4771.0102. (specifying Ohio agent regulations)
47. See BLACK'S LAw DICnONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining "bribery" as "[t] he
corrupt payment, receipt, or solicitation of a private favor for official action," defining "embezzlement" as "[t] he fraudulent taking of personal property with which
one has been entrusted, especially as a fiduciary," and defining "fraud" as "[a]
knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment," and adding that "[c]riminal fraud is
fraud that has been made illegal by statute"); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.1
(proscribing bribery).
48. See Darren Heitner, A Year and a Day Behind Bars for Andrew Moss, http://
www.sportsagentblog.com/2009/10/26/a-year-and-a-day-behind-bars-for-andrewmoss/ (last updated Oct. 26, 2009) (contrasting sentence agent received with maximum available); Michael O'Keeffe, Agent of Change, Tank Black Is Out of Jail and
Out to Prove in New Book That He Didn't Defraud Sports Stars, DAILY NEWs, at 82 (Sept.
13, 2009) (outlining charges of fraud levied against agent); United States v. Wal-
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Lastly, agents, like anyone else, are subject to potential liability
under state common and civil laws. In this regard, agents could
potentially be liable to a large number of claimants, including the
athlete, a college, a business partner, the state or anyone else injured by the agent's conduct.4 9 For example, Section 16 of the
UAAA provides for a right of action against an athlete agent by an
educational institution.5 0 Additionally, Section 17 proposes to allow the Secretary of State to assess civil penalties against agents. 5 1
Despite all these criminal and civil remedies, a law is only as
effective as its enforcement. Unfortunately, a person with knowledge of the sports and agent industries do not think the UAAA or
any other state laws are being actively and effectively enforced. Consequently, athlete-agents have acted with relative impunity from
state law.
B.

Federal Legislation: Sports Agent Responsibility
and Trust Act ("SPARTA")

In twenty-five years as the head coach of the Nebraska football
team, Tom Osborne won three national championships and was
widely regarded as a symbol of class in college football, even though
his teams had their share of unsavory characters and were twice subjected to NCAA sanctions during his tenure.5 2 In 2000, three years
after he retired from coaching, Osborne was elected to be the U.S.
House of Representative from Nebraska.5 3 As a member of Congress, Osborne was instrumental in the passing of the Sports Agent
Responsibility and Trust Act ("SPARTA") in 2004.54
ters and Bloom, 913 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding reversible error by lower
court); People v. Sorkin, 407 N.Y.S.2d 772 (N.Y. App. Div 1978).
49. See, e.g., Agent Ducks Charges, Pays School, S.F. CHRON., June 3, 1988, at D5
(discussing agent's liability to school).
50. See UAAA §16 (2000) (describing schools' right to sue athlete agents).
51. See id. § 17 (dictating Secretary of State's right to assess civil penalties
against athlete agents).
52. See Osborne: It's Time to Go, N.Y. PosT, (Dec. 11, 1997) (discussing legacy of
Osbourne).
53. See Homestead National Monument of America, http://www.nps.gov/
home/historycult-ure/upload/OsborneBi0.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2010) (summarizing Osbourne's tenure in football and political career).
54. See Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act, 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 7801-7807
(2004) (regulating agents' activities). See also Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust
Act: Hearing on H.R. 361 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H.
Comm. on theJudiciary,108th Cong. 4 (2003) (noting that Osborne made prepared
statement to subcommittee and was witness during hearing); John A. Gray, Sports
Agent's Liability After SPARTA ?, 6 VA. SPORTs & ENT. L.J. 141, n.3 (2006) ("SPARTA
was sponsored by Rep. Bart Bordon ... and was created in conjunction with Rep.
Tim Osborne ... former University of Nebraska, Lincoln, head football coach.").
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The heart of the act lists the unlawful activity covered under
the act, including soliciting clients with misleading information,
making false promises, providing anything of value as an inducement or neglecting to provide a required disclosure statement
warning the student-athlete that he or she may lose his or her eligibility.55 This statutory format is nearly identical to Section 10 of the
UAAA described earlier.5 6 SPARTA deems any violation to be an
"unfair or deceptive act or practice" within the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC).67 In addition, SPARTA provides
for civil causes of action by states and educational institutions
against agents in the same manner as the UAAA. 5 8
Like the UAAA, SPARTA provides the legislative framework to
end unethical and illegal behavior by agents.-5 9 However, to date,
the FTC has not brought an action against any agent and some
members of its staff were generally unaware that the statute
existed.6 0
C.

NCAA Rules and Bylaws

On the collegiate level there are two relevant sets of regulations: first, the NCAA Bylaws and second, the rules of each individual member institution. As a "voluntary organization through
which the nation's colleges and universities govern their athletic
programs," the NCAA has no jurisdiction over agents.61 The NCAA
consists of over a thousand member institutions, all of which participate in the creation of NCAA rules and voluntarily submit to its
authority. 6 2 As a private organization not subject to the scrutiny of a
state actor the NCAA can only exercise plenary power over its mem55. See 15 U.S.C. § 7802 (2004) (describing unlawful conduct SPARTA is designed to combat).
56. See UAAA § 10 (2000).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 7803.
58. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7804-7805 (2004) (providing for civil action by states and
educational institutions).
59. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7802-7805 (consisting of legislation on unethical behavior
and causes of action thereunder).
60. See E-mail from Henry Buckmon, Program Support Specialist, Office Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission (Mar. 19, 2010, 1:11 PM
EDT) (on file with author) (noting that no action has been levied against any
agent); E-mail from James Reilly Dolan, Assistant Director for Financial Practices,
Federal Trade Commission (Mar. 22, 2010, 1:29 PM EDT) (on file with author)
(discussing application of SPARTA).
61. NCAA PresidentPosition Description,NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/

portal/ncaa-home?WCM GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/ncaa/ncaa/ncaa+news/ncaa+
news+online/2010/association-wide/ncaa president description, (last visited Oct.
23, 2010).
62. See id. (denoting membership among colleges and universities).
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ber institutions, their employees and their student-athletes. 63 Consequently, while the NCAA has extensive regulations concerning
contact with agents, the NCAA can only enforce punishment
against the member institution, its employees and student-athletes. 64 One of the most common situations where regulation is involved is when a student-athlete loses eligibility for receiving a gift
of some kind from an agent. 6 5 If the student-athlete has already
moved on to his professional career, however, the school often
faces the penalties alone because the student is no longer within
the 'jurisdiction" of the NCAA. 6 6
The NCAA's enforcement of these bylaws has probably made
discovering agent misconduct more difficult. Prior to the 2008 season, the NCAA suspended Oregon tackle Fenuki Tupou for one
game after he received a meal and $100 from an agent.6 7 Tupou
had met the agent for lunch to discuss future representation, as is
customary among senior student-athletes. 6 8 When the meal was
over, the agent, Tim Norling of LMM Sports Management, allegedly paid for the meal and gave Tupou $100 in a handshake, de63. See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988) (discussing scope of NCAA's
power).
64. See National Collegiate Athletic Association, 2009-10 NCAA DivisION I
MANUAL (2009), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4180-2010-2011ncaa-division-i-manual.aspx, (speaking about rules and punishments); Bylaws 10.1,
11.1.4, 12.1.2, 12.2.4.3 and 12.3 (covering member institutions, employees and student-athletes).
65. See Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621 (Colo. App. 2004) (upholding NCAA
bylaws despite special circumstances surrounding student-athlete's situation as professional skier); Shelton v. NCAA, 539 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1976) (providing rational basis review for NCAA rule); Barnhart, supra note 2 (discussing
repercussions of student-athlete accepting gift from agent); Oliver v. NCAA, 920
N.E.2d 203 (Ohio Com. Pl. 2009) (noting scope of NCAA power); Dez Reportedly
Hires Parker FootballFormer OSU Receiver's New Agent a Longtime Deion Associate , THE
OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 11, 2010, at 14B (mentioning punishable offenses); Eddie
Timanus, Williams Can't Return to USC, USA TODAY, Aug. 27, 2004 at IC (discussing
impact of violations on college football programs);.
66. See Gary Klein, USC Meets with NCAA; Trojans Finally Face Music; Allegations
RegardingBush and Mayo Are the Centerpieceof Hearingin Front of Infractions Committee,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2010, at C6 (describing scandal involving USC and Reggie
Bush); Michael Dobie, Red-Flagged, NCAA May Have Strong Case to Sanction St.
John's, NEWSDAY), Mar. 26, 2000, at C03 (noting that schools are left to pick up
pieces after student-athletes leave for professional career after breaking NCAA
rules while enrolled in school); Lisa Olson, Camby Has Felt Both Bark and Bite from
NCAA, DAILY NEWS (New York), Mar. 16, 2000, at 80 (showing that sometimes student-athletes that turn professional are held liable for monetary damages).
67. SeeJohn Hunt, UO FootballPlayer Tupou Incident Probed by NFTL Players Union,
THE OREGONIAN, Sept. 4, 2008 at D04 (mentioning that university unsuccessfully
attempted to return money and highlighting that NCAA rules are sometimes broken unintentionally).
68. See id. (stating agent denied giving Tupou $100 and said he did not intentionally pay for Tupou's meal).
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spite Tupou's repeated refusals to take the money.6 9 Tupou told
Oregon's director of compliance about the situation, who then reported the incident to the NCAA. 7 0 While many would argue that
the NCAA should commend Tupou for trying to do the right thing
and reporting the incident in a timely fashion, the NCAA instead
suspended Tupou. 7 1 Apparently, the NCAA regards violations of its
amateurism regulations as strict liability offenses despite the obviously chilling effect that such a suspension will have on players reporting violations in the future.
Although the NCAA has no direct jurisdiction over agents, as
described earlier, the UAAA does empower educational institutions
with certain regulatory powers and the ability to file civil suits.72
Many NCAA member institutions require each agent wishing to recruit a player at that school to also register with the school's athletic
department or compliance office. 73 The majority of agents, however, do not comply. 74 Educational institutions have the best resources and incentives to enforce the UAAA. Schools know or can
reasonably find out which agents their athletes have signed with
and then determine whether the agent has met the requirements of
the school's athletic department and the UAAA, most notably Section 11, which requires notice to the educational institution within
seventy-two hours of the agency contract.7 5
NCAA Bylaws also permit member institutions to use Professional Sports Counseling Panels ("PSCPs") to aid student-athletes
69. See Mike Florio, Topou Blows Whistle on Agent, PROFOOTBALLTALK.COM
(Sept. 2, 2008, 10:59 AM ET), http://collegefootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2008/09/
02/topou-blows-whistle-on-agent/ (noting that many athletes are put in same situation and pocket money without saying anything).
70. See Hunt, supra note 67 (recognizing that Tupou apologized for putting
himself in situation).

71. See Florio, supra note 69 (admiring Tupou for doing right thing); see also
Associated Press, Tupou Will Return to Ducks Following One-Game Suspension,
ESPN.com, (Sept. 3, 2008) (reporting that Tupou will return after one-game suspension for receiving improper benefits from representative of management
company).

72. See UAAA §§ 15, 17 (2000) (explaining that violations of parts of act
prohibiting certain conduct may result in criminal and administrative
punishments).
73. See Telephone Interview with Boland, supra note 10 (summarizing agent
registration at schools); Telephone Interview with Lattinville, supra note 10
(describing agent registration at schools).
74. See Telephone Interview with Boland, supranote 10 (noting compliance of
agents); Telephone Interview with Lattinville, supra note 10 (discussing agent's
compliance with regulatons).
75. See UAAA § 11 (addressing seventy two hour policy).
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during the agent-hiring process.7 6 PSCPs generally consist of
coaches, athletic department representatives and members of the
school's faculty or administration. While registration with the
school and the use of PSCPs is meant to protect the student-athlete
and allow the school to closely monitor agent activity with its student-athletes, the PSCPs can also create conflicts of interest.7 7
PSCPs can be used as a way of excluding certain agents, pushing
student-athletes towards other agents (such as those representing
the school's coaches), and extracting additional (generally permissible) benefits from the agent on behalf of the student-athlete, such
as training costs, stipends or favorable commission arrangements.7 8
In addition, due to the increasing complexities of the agent
selection process, some schools have begun hiring consulting services to handle the process.7 9 Such relationships inevitably come
with more accusations of conflicts of interest and favoritism, as the
consultants are hired by the school and might have the school's
best interests in mind rather than the student-athlete's.8 0 Although the NCAA often acts demonstrably and decisively in
dealing with its own members, the NCAA has no authority over
agents.8 1 Conversely, NCAA member institutions have some au76. See 2009-10 NCAA DivisioN I MANUAL, supra note 66, Bylaw 11.1.4 (explaining that when coaches contact agents or sports team on behalf of athlete, no
compensation may be received).
77. See Telephone Interview with Boland, supra note 10 (detailing conflicts of
interest); Telephone Interview with Lattinville, supra note 10 (describing how
PSCPs creates conflicts of interest).
78. See Telephone Interview with Boland, supra note 10 (discussing student
athletes); Telephone Interview with Lattinville, supra note 10 (noting PSCP's involvement with student athletes). See also Interview with Jon Perzley, NFLPA Certified Contract Advisor, Sportstars, Inc. (Mar. 23, 2010) (detailing agent and student
athlete relationships).
79. See Liz Mullen, Some Agents Question Former NFL Exec's Role with Schools,
SPORTSBUSINESSJOURNAL (Aug. 24, 2009), http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/
article/63356 (noting that these services are used within guidelines of NCAA to
assist universities in "pre-NFL combine training"); see also CORNERSTONE SPORTS
(last visited Oct. 23,
CONSULTING, http://cornerstonesports.co-m/about.html
2010) (addressing program designed to educate and prepare student athletes and

their families for NFL career opportunities).
80. See Mullen, supranote 81 (citing unidentified agent's report that conflicts
of interest existed when NFL executive previously worked at major NFL representation firm).
81. See Glenn Wong et al., The NCAA's Infractions Appeals Committee: Recent Case
History, Analysis and the Beginning of a New Chapter,9 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 48
(2009) (detailing NCAA's interdisciplinary process). See also Mike Rogers & Rory
Ryan, Navigating the Bylaw Maze in NCAA Major-Infractions Cases, 37 SETON HALL L.
REv. 749, 753-54 (2007) (explaining how NCAA deals with infractions); Rob Remis
& Diane Sudia, Escaping Athlete Agent Statutory Regulation: Loopholes and Constitutional Defectiveness Based on Tri-Parte Classificationof Athletes, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT
L. 1, 45 n.165 (1999) (citing Rob Remis, Analysis of Civil and Criminal Penalties in
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thority over athletes; however, enforcement is still relatively lacking.8 2 While NCAA member institutions and their compliance
staffs work diligently to ensure that they will not face any NCAA
sanctions, they are understandably less interested in what the student-athlete does once the athlete's eligibility has been exhausted,
perhaps explaining their indifference to Section 11 of the UAAA. 83
D.

Bar Association Ethics Rules

Approximately half of the NFLPA's certified agents have a law
degree. 84 Presumably most of them followed up their J.D. by becoming a licensed attorney in one of the 50 states.8 5 If so, those
agents are subject to the ethics rules of each state's bar association
in which the agent-attorney is licensed to practice.8 6
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("MRPC") lists a
plethora of rules that could be implicated by some of the wrongful
behavior of agents.8 7 For example, Rule 1.1 requires "competent"
representation, Rule 1.7 governs conflicts of interest, Rule 1.15
strictly directs how a lawyer is to handle client money and Rule 5.3
holds attorneys liable for the conduct of non-lawyer employees,
such as "runners."8 8 In addition, Rule 7.1 prohibits false or misleading communications about a lawyer's services, Rule 7.2 prohibits a lawyer from giving anything of value to a person for
Athlete Agent Statutes and Supportfor the Imposition of Civil and CriminalLiability Upon
Athletes, 8 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 1, 8-12, 53-59 (1998) (mentioning that NCAA is
'voluntary organization comprised of institutional members, and does not have
authority to impose sanctions against agents")).
82. See Remis & Sudia, supra note 83, at 9 (describing how NCAA can control
student-athletes by forcing member institutions to declare student-athlete
ineligible).
83. See id. at 53-54 (suggesting that member institutions stand to lose significant revenue if student-athletes are deemed ineligible); see also Gray, supra note 54,
at 148 (explaining Section 11 of the UAAA prevents member institutions from
facing sanctions or penalties while student-athlete is ineligible).
84. See Mark Doman, Attorneys as Athlete-Agents: Reconciling the ABA Rules of Professional Conduct with the Practice of Athlete Representation,5 TEX. REv. ENT. & SPORTS
L. 37, 73 n.134 (2003) (specifying that 412 out of 844 certified NFLPA contract
advisors held law degree as of April 3, 2003).
85. See id. at 73 ("If these [attorney-agents] were to abide by the rules set out
by their state bars, and non-attorney agents were forced to follow similar regulations set out by the NFLPA, it is clear that the industry would be headed in the
right direction.").
86. See id. (noting if non-attorneys had similar provisions to follow under
NFLPA, "the industry would be headed in the right direction").
87. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT, (6th ed. 2006), available at http://-

wwwabanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mrpc-toc.html (stating these new rules were adopted
to serve as model of law governing legal profession).
88. See id. (addressing other rules governing agent behavior); see also Interview
with Fox, supra note 18 (detailing role of "runners").
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recommending the lawyer's services and Rule 7.3 limits a lawyer's
ability to solicit clients. 9
As in nearly all of these agent situations, evidence of wrongful
behavior is difficult to obtain or verify.9 0 Nevertheless, attorneyagents arguably have the most interest in seeing bar ethics rules
enforced against their fellow attorney-agents. Rule 8.3 specifically
requires attorneys to report a known violation of the MRPC. 9 1 Although there is generally not a requirement to report suspected
violations, agent-attorneys should report the unethical conduct of
other agent-lawyers to their respective bar associations.9 2 Reliable
evidence is difficult to find, but agent-attorneys who desire a clean
industry must self-police the industry.9 3 Bar association reporting
requirements are implemented irrespective of any arbitration procedure that a PA may use to settle disputes between agents, as will
be discussed in more detail below. 9 4
Bar association ethic rules have no jurisdiction over agents who
are not attorneys, thereby creating a regulatory disparity.9 5 To remedy this, some have argued that the business of being an athleteagent should be considered the "practice of law," thereby requiring
all agents to be attorneys. 96 Complicating the matter even further,
89. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (outlining various violations).
90. See Doman, supra note84, at 45 (noting athlete representation leads to
problematic behavior under "legal ethics rules, case law, and interpretations").
91. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 8.3 (stating that lawyers "shall
inform the appropriate professional authority" when they know of another lawyer's
violation of rule "that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects").
92. See Alex B. Long, Whistleblowing Attorneys and Ethical Infrastructures,68 MD.
L. REv. 786, 788 (2009) (pointing out lack of current requirements that attorneys
report on colleagues and lack of ethical infrastructures); Caroline P. Jacobson,
Academic Misconduct and BarAdmissions: A Proposalfor a Revised Standard, 20 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 739, 754 (2007) (proposing changes to Code of Recommended
Standards, which deal with academic misconduct).
93. See Melissa Steedle Bogad, Maybe Jeny Maguire Should Have Stuck With Law
School: How the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act Implements Law-Like Rules for
Sports Agents, 27 CARDOzo L. REv. 1889, 1918 n.170 (2006) (explaining "crucial
competitor," the attorney-agent, might be most effective way to force legal compliance and self-policing of industry).
94. For a further discussion of arbitration procedures for PAs, see infra notes
171-76, and accompanying text.
95. SeeJeremyJ. Geisel, DisbarringJenyMaguire: How Broadly Defining "Unauthorized Practice of Law" Could Take the "Lawyer" out of "Lawyer-Agent" Despite the Current
State of Athlete Agent Legislation, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 225, 227 (2007) (discussing differences between attorney and non-attorney agents, and disparities between
how acts of each group is governed).
96. See id. at 245-46 (proposing changes to MRPC Rule 5.5 and others to give
attorneys more leeway to participate in other professions); see also Sande L. Buhai,
Act Like a Lawyer, Be judged Like a Lawyer: The Standard of Care for the Unlicensed
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the MRPC does not define the practice of law, instead the code only
prohibit the "unauthorized practice of law."9 7 What constitutes the
practice of law is left to the broad interpretations of state courts and
state bar associations."8 Thus, the practice of law includes a variety
of services, such as litigating cases in court, preparing documents to
bring about various transactions, and advising clients on legal questions. 99 When analyzing an agent's time, it is difficult to classify the
bulk of it as the practice of law. Much of an agent's time is spent
representing the athlete in his or her relationships with the team,
league, media, sponsors or fans. Contract negotiation is not exclusively a legal skill and agents rarely do any substantive legal analysis.
E.

Player Association (PA) Regulations

On a daily basis, the most important regulatory scheme that
agents must deal with is the PA. Pursuant to §9(a) of the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") the PAs, as the approved representative of the player-employees by the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB"), are the exclusive representative of the player-employees
for purposes of collective bargaining.1 00 As the representative of
the players, a union's main role is to negotiate the terms and conditions of employment with the league in a collective bargaining
Practiceof Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 87, 128 (2007) (explaining by participating in
contract negotiations, lay agents practice law).
97. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 5.5.
98. See Geisel, supra note 97, at 226-27 (showing various courts have "broadly
defined unauthorized practice of law") (citation omitted); see also Michael S.
Knowles, Keep Your Friends Close and the Layman Closer: State Bar Associations Can
Combat the Problems Associated with Nonlawyers Engaging in the Unauthorized Practiceof
Estate PlanningThrough a Certification System, 43 CREIGHTON L. REv. 885 (2010) (explaining that state bar associations develop licensing requirements and regulate
lawyers).

99. See BLACK's LAw DicrONARY, 1210 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "practice of
law"); see also Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank v. Super. Ct., 949 P.2d 1, 5
(Cal. 1998) (citing People v. Merchs. Protective Corp., 209 P. 363, 365 (Cal. 1922),
and holding practice of law involves "the doing and performing services in a court
of justice in any matter depending therein throughout its various states and in
conformity with the adopted rules of procedure").
100. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
Any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at
any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative,
as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-

bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: providing further, that
the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at
such adjustment.
Id.
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agreement ("CBA").101 In any labor situation, as the exclusive representative of employees, unions can designate agents to represent
employees in dealings with an individual employer, such as a
team. 102 Each of the CBAs between the "Big 4" leagues and its respective PA recognizes the PA's exclusive jurisdiction over player
agents.10 3
As restrictions on player movement lessened and free agency
became a reality in the 1970s and beyond, the use of player agents
proliferated. 104 Player salaries increased along with player movement, attracting more people to the player representation industry,
which necessitated regulation. 0 5 In 1982, the NFLPA became the
first PA to certify and regulate player agents with other leagues soon
to follow.10 6 The NBPA has not updated their regulations since
1991, the MLBPA since 1997 and the NHLPA since 2008.107
The NFLPA updates their regulations every few years, most recently in 2007, as the NFL agent industry seems to be the most competitive. 08 The competition arises for a variety of reasons,
including the fact that there are almost 1,700 roster spots in the
NFL, about the same as the MLB, the NBA and the NHL combined,
101. See id. § 159(a) (saying designated representatives are exclusive representatives for purposes of collective bargaining issues).
102. See Magic Pan, Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 105, 109-10 (7th Cir. 1980) (citing
General Electric Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512, 520 n.6 (2nd Cir. 1969) (explaining
relationship between unions and agents)); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,
415 F.2d 174, 178 (8th Cir. 1969); Standard Oil Co. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 40, 44 (6th
Cir. 1963). See also Richard T. Karcher, FundamentalFairnessin Union Regulation of
Sports Agents, 40 CONN. L. REv 355, 359 n. 7 (2007) (describing player contract
negotiations)).
103. See NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement (2006-2012), Art. VI, available
at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/20343876/NFL-Collective-Bargaining-Agreement-2006-2012 (noting [Hereinafter NFL CBA]; MLB Collective Bargaining
Agreement (2007-2011), Arts. II & IV, available at www.mlbplayers.com (discussing
recognition, approval and negotiation of contracts) [Hereinafter MLB CBA]; National Hockey League Collective Bargaining Agreement (2005-2011), Art. VI, available at http://www.nhl.com/cba/2005-CBA.pdf (explaining NFLPA agent
certification); National Basketball Association Collective Bargaining Agreement,
Art. XXXIV, available at www.nbpa.com (illustrating recognition clause) [Hereinafter NBA CBA].
104. See KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE & TIMOTHY DAvis, THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS
AGENTS 10-11 (University of Pennsylvania Press 2002) (explaining demise of "extensive use of reserve and option clauses in standard player contracts" allowed for
athletes to take their contracts to open market).
105. See id. at 11 (detailing drastic increases in athlete salaries, resulting from
competition from newly created leagues in football, hockey and basketball).
106. See NFLPA History, NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION http://www.nflpa.org/
about-us/History/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (noting first regulation in 1982).
107. See NFLPA Regulations, supra note 43 (detailing dates of modification of
each agreement).
108. See id. (showing last update to agreement in 2007).
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and there are no established minor leagues, where an agent might
have to financially support a player.10 9 In addition, the NFLPA has
a stringent registration process, requiring an application fee of

$1,650, a postgraduate degree and successful completion of a written examination covering the CBA and agent regulations.110
The agent regulations of the respective PAs are very similar in
their construction. In all of them, Section 3(B) outlines prohibited
conduct, including providing anything of value as an inducement
to obtain a client, providing materially false or misleading information to a prospective client, holding a financial interest in a team,
engaging in any conflict of interest and engaging in unlawful conduct, dishonesty, fraud or deceit."' Only the NFLPA specifically
prohibits borrowing money from a player or soliciting clients who
already have agents.11 2 In addition, Section 5 of all the regulations
requires any dispute between the agent and the PA or another

agent to be arbitrated.1 13 Since 1994, the NFLPA has designated
the same arbitrator, Roger Kaplan, for every arbitration hearing,
calling into question the fairness of the arbitration process, discussed in further detail herein.' 14
The PAs have the most direct interest, knowledge and resources necessary for proper regulation and enforcement of agent
109. See NFL Teams, NFL.com, http://www.nfl.com/teams (last visited Oct. 11,
2010) (showing thirty-two NFL teams, each with fifty-three roster spots, totaling
1,696 players); MLBPA Info, MLB.com, http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/info/
faqjsp#roster (last visited Oct. 11, 2010) (explaining during regular season, each
of thirty teams is allowed twenty-five man roster, totaling 750 players); NHL Teams,
NHL.com, http://www.nhl.com/ice/teams.htm#?nav-tms-main (last visited Oct.
11, 2010) (detailing thirty NHL teams, each with twenty-three players, totaling 690
players); NBA Teams, NBA.com, http://www.nba.com/teams/teamndividual
Links.html?title=Te-am%20Roster&file=roster (last visited Aug. 28, 2010) (showing
thirty teams, each with fifteen man rosters, totaling 450 players).
110. See NFLPA Regulations, supra note 45 (describing agent qualifications).
111. See NFLPA Regulations, supra note 45 §3(B) (setting forth conduct prohibited in NFL); NBPA Regulations, supra note 45 §3(B) (setting forth conduct
prohibited in NBA); MLBPA Regulations, supra note 45 §3(B) (setting forth conduct prohibited in MLB); NHLPA Regulations, supra note 45 §3(B) (setting forth
conduct prohibited in NHL).
112. See NFLPA Regulations, supra note 45 §3(B) (6), (21) (describing unique
NFL regulation).
113. See NFLPA Regulations, supra note 45 §5 (setting forth type of legal recourse available between agents or agent and PA in NFL); NBAPA Regulations,
supra note 43 §5 (setting forth type of legal recourse available between agents or
agent and PA in NBA); MLBPA Regulations, supranote 43 §5 (setting forth type of
legal recourse available between agents or agent and PA in MLB); NHLPA Regulations, supra note 43 §5 (setting forth type of legal recourse available between
agents or agent and PA in MLB).
114. See Karcher, supra note 8 (stating role of Roger Kaplan as NFLPA's designated arbitrator).
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behavior. There are still however significant questions about the
strength and consistency of the PAs' enforcement.' 15 As discussed
earlier, the states have a difficult administrative task in enforcing
their athlete-agent laws, which is made even more difficult by the
PAs failure to communicate with the states regarding agent activity. 1 6 Perhaps the most abused rule is the provision against providing inducements.' 1 7 While offering student-athletes cash or other
benefits before they are your clients is obviously in violation of the
rules, agents customarily give players money after they have signed.
The money may be called a "signing bonus" or a stipend or guaranteed marketing income, but the end result is the same, no matter
how the money is classified the act of giving the money is unethical.
In the 2008 NFL Draft, thirty players chosen in the first three
rounds were juniors.1 8 Agents were not allowed, however, to actively recruit them because of the so-called 'junior Rule" which prohibited agents from having any contact with players not yet eligible
for the NFL Draft until January 15.119 In the NFL, a player is not
eligible for the draft until three NFL seasons have elapsed since his
0
high school graduation, generally after his junior year of college.12
The rule only ended up benefiting the agents who ignored the rule
and reached oral agreements with juniors before the permissible
date.'12 Thus, the rule was amended after the 2008 season to per115. See Telephone Interview with Boland, supra note 10 (explaining issues
resulting from non-regulation); Telephone Interview with Parker, supra note 10
(detailing problems with interpretation of rules).
116. See E-Mail from Powell, supra note 17 (documenting state enforcement
problems).
117. See NFLPA Regulations, supra note 43 § 3(B) (2) (stating rule against
inducements).

118. See 2008 NFL Draft, NFL.com http://www.nfl.com/draft/2008 (last visited Oct. 11, 2010) (listing players drafted in each round of 2008 NFL Draft).
119. See Mike Florio, Underclassmen Can Talk to Agents on Monday, PROFOOTBALLTALK.COM (Jan. 16, 2009, 10:16 AM ET), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.
(explaining incom/2009/01/16/underclassmen-can-talk-to-agents-on-monday/
teractions between agents and underclassmen); Telephone Interview with Parker,
supra note 10 (illustrating 'junior rule").
120. See NFL CBA, supra note 103, Art. XVI, § 2(b) (prohibiting player from
entering draft until at least "three regular seasons have begun and ended following
either his graduation from high school or graduation of the class with which he
entered high school, whichever is earlier"). Prior to the 2006 extension of the
CBA, this rule was not specifically in the CBA but only in the NFL Bylaws and
Constitution. See Clarett v. National Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir.
2004) ("Despite the collective bargaining agreement's comprehensiveness with respect to, inter alia, the manner in which the NFL clubs select rookies through the
draft and the scheme by which rookie compensation is determined, the eligibility
rules for the draft do not appear in the agreement.").
121. See Mike Florio, More on the "Mockery" Some Agents Have Made of the junior
Rule, PROFOOTBALLTALK.COM (Jan. 17, 2009, 5:23 PM ET), http://profootballtalk.
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mit agents to have contact with juniors at the latest of the studentathlete's final regular season game, bowl game or the first day in
December.122

In any case, the fact remains that many people interested in
obtaining a financial benefit from association with a future NFL
player can and do contact the student-athletes long before they declare for the draft. To combat this and other problems, the NFLPA
began regulating and requiring the registration of Financial Advisors in 2002.123 This program has not been without issues, and now
the perception is that the regulations only empower other nonagents and non-financial advisors who are not prohibited from
gaining access to the student-athletes, such as marketing
representatives.1 24
III.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

In the face of a complex and multi-tiered regulatory environment, agent misconduct might be worse than ever. 125 Ideally, enforcement on the state and federal levels would improve
substantially. For a state or federal government, however, arming
itself with a staff of investigators and lawyers to find and prosecute
nbcspo-rts.com/2009/01/17/more-on-the-mockery-some-agents-have-made-of-thejunior-rule/ (discussing potential mockery of "Junior Rule" by players working out
at API Training Institute which requires agent representation before date on
which agents are allowed to speak to players).
122. See Mike Florio, NFLPA Tweaks junior Rule, But Doesn't Go FarEnough,
PROFOOTBALLTALK.COM (Mar. 18, 2009, 10:50 AM ET), http://profootballtalk.nbc
sports.co-m/2009/03/18/nflpa-tweaks-junior-rule-but-doesnt-go-far-enough/
(discussing possibility of new rule in which agents may communicate with underclassmen upon latest of three dates: their final regular-season game, their bowl game,
and first day in December).
123. See NFL Players Bilked of $42M, NEWSDAY, Feb. 2, 2002, at C17 (describing
program launched NFLPA to regulate players' financial advisors in response to
alleged defrauding of players); See also Hillard v. Black, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1074
(N.D. Fla. 2000) (detailing how players sued sports agents alleging financial scam);
see also FinancialAdvisor FAQs, NFL PLAYERS AssOCIATION, http://www.nflplayers.

com/about-us/FAQs/Financial-Advisor-FAQs/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (answering questions related to regulation of financial advisors).
124. See Mike Florio, Marketing reps mix it up in Indy, PROFOOTBALLTALK.COM
(Feb. 27, 2010, 11:32 AM ET), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2010/02/
27/marketing-reps-mix-it-up-in-indy/ (depicting bar fight between marketing representatives and stating that they are not regulated by NFL even though receiving
larger commissions than contract agents); Scott Wolf, Settlement in Bush's Civil Lawsuit Reached, DAILY NEWS, L.A., Apr. 22, 2010 at C7 (describing Reggie Bush's civil

case against a would-be sports marketer); see also Atwater v. NFL Players Ass'n, 2009
WL 3254925 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2009) (describing how several NFL players alleged
that NFL negligently performed background checks on certain financial advisors).
125. See Telephone Interview with Parker, supra note 10 (describing current
state of sports agent actions).
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possible violations would be quite costly. The financial support for
such a high level of enforcement would most likely have to come in
the form of increased registration fees for agents.12 6 Increased
costs, however, already serve as a significant barrier to the entry of
many aspiring agents into the athletic arena.12 7 As a result, there
has been considerable consolidation in the industry, giving larger
agencies a significant marginal cost advantage, at the potential detriment to players. 2 8
Considering the relative complexity of the work and the potential for fairly large commissions, a shortage of educated people interested in representing athletes anytime soon is unlikely. In such a
competitive environment, with a general lack of enforcement,
agents who choose to follow the rules are at a competitive disadvantage.129 Such agents are left with few options and mostly litigious
ones at that. Holding student and professional athletes more accountable for their own wrongdoing could potentially clean up
some of the problems, and a clean agent's best option may be to
sue other agents, the government and/or the PA.
A.

Hold Athletes Accountable

Len Elmore was an All-American at the University of Maryland
and then continued with a ten-year NBA career.' 3 0 Following his
retirement from the NBA in 1984, Elmore graduated from Harvard
126. See Telephone Interview with Boland, supra note 10(noting effect of increased enforcement of regulations); Telephone Interview with Lattinville, supra
note 10 (discussing increased enforcement of regulations); Telephone Interview
with Golka, supra note 10 (listing one effect of increasing enforcement of
regulations).
127. See Lloyd Zane Remick & Christopher Joseph Cabott, Keeping Out the Little Guy: An Older Contract Advisor's Concern, a Younger Contract Advisor's Lament, 12
VILL. SPoars & ENT. L.J. 1, 10 (2005) (discussing high costs and fees associated
with entering athlete agency industry).
128. SeeTelephone Interview with Boland, supranote 10 (explaining effects of
increasing barriers to agents looking to enter industry); see also William Rothstein,
The Business of Sports Representation: Agent Evolution in the "Industry",9 VA. SPORTS &
EN-. L.J. 19, 21-25 (2009) (explaining evolution of sports agency industry and current concerns); Scott R. Rosner, Conflicts of Interest and the Shifting Paradigmof Athlete Representation, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 193 (2004) (describing history and
strategy of consolidation in sports agency industry and efficacy of current business
model); Jason Gershwin, Will ProfessionalAthletes Continue to Choose Their Representation Freely? An Examination of the Enforceability of Non-Compete Agreements Against Sports
Agents, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 585 (2003) (analyzing effects of non-compete
agreements in agents' contracts on sports agency industry).
129. See Email from Paget, supra note 10 (opining clean agents are at competitive disadvantage).
130. See CBS Sports TV Team, Len Elmore Biography, CBSSPORTs.COM, http://
www.cbssp-orts.com/cbssports/team/lelmore (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (summarizing biography of Len Elmore). Elmore played for eight years with NBA teams
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Law School and served as an Assistant District Attorney in Brooklyn,
N.Y.1 3 1 Elmore is well known to the public as an announcer of college basketball games but is eminently regarded in the sports law
world. During an Agent Regulation panel at the 2009 Sports Lawyers Association Conference, Elmore expressed disappointment in
the role of student-athletes in agent scandals and suggested there
be a way to hold them accountable.1 32
As explained above, an NCAA student-athlete will most likely
lose eligibility or be suspended if the athlete has dealt with an agent
in violation of NCAA rules.' 33 However, often times the studentathlete has moved on to the professional ranks, leaving the school
as the only party punished under NCAA rules.13 4 If the PAs were
serious about preventing undesirable situations and transactions
with agents, they could agree, in conjunction with their respective
leagues, to suspend or otherwise punish players for conduct arising
out of their involvement with an unethical agent. The league
would have to argue jurisdiction over the issue because the player's
participation in the professional league would necessarily be involved. However, this would be a peculiar and unlikely provision,
however, if the NFL or any other league grew sufficiently tired of
their players being viewed in an unfavorable light as a result of alleged or actual misconduct while student-athletes, and requested
such authority in a CBA.
Thirty four of the thirty nine states that have passed some form
of the UAAA provide for the state or educational institution to recover from student-athletes who intentionally or knowingly commit
NCAA violations or otherwise are complicit in illegal activity.' 35
but played his first two seasons with the Indiana Pacers before they entered the
NBA. See id. (explaining Elmore's career path).
131. See id. (documenting Elmore's post-basketball career).
132. See Len Elmore, Question, Ethics - Agent Regulation (Sports Lawyers Association Annual Conference, Chi., IL, May 15, 2009) (noting Elmore's participation in
Conference). Conference Brochure available at www.sportslaw.org > Conference
Info > 2009 Annual Conference.
133. See Timanus, supra note 67 (explaining student violations of NCAA
regulations).
134. See Klein, supra note 68 (explaining reality of punishment for violating
NCAA rules).
135. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1775 (2001) ("An educational institution
may bring a cause of action against an athlete agent or a former student athlete for
damages caused by a violation of [Arizona's athlete agent laws]"); ARK. CODE. ANN.
§17-16-116 (2001) (providing "a right of action against an athlete agent or former
student-athlete for damages caused by a violation" of Arkansas' athlete agent laws);
Coio. REV. STAT. § 23-16-215 (2008); CONN GEN. STAT. § 20-5590 (2005); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 24 § 5416 (2002); D.C. CODE § 47-2887.15 (2002); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 43-4A-18 (2010); HAw. REv. STAT. § 481E-15 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-4816

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol18/iss1/1

24

Deubert: What's a Clean Agent to Do - The Case for a Cause of Action again

2011]

WHAT'S A "CLEAN" AGENT TO

Do?

25

Schools and states cannot consider the student-athletes as blameless
and should seek to recover from them when appropriate. Nearly
every student-athlete is a legal adult, capable of signing contracts,
making purchases on credit or serving in the military. To absolve
them of all responsibility in every case is factually erroneous and
does not serve to end the evil intended by the regulations.
B.

Sue Other Agents

Despite the requirement of the PA regulations that agents submit their grievances against other agents to arbitration, agents have
Many of the litigated cases
also resorted to suing each other.'
between agents involve one agent leaving a firm and taking his clients with him, invoking claims of breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and/or unfair competition.' 7 In one of the
most high-profile cases, longtime NFL agent Leigh Steinberg won a
multi-million dollar judgment against his protige David Dunn
(2001); 225 ILL. Come. STAT. 401/185 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011); IND. CODE § 25-5.2-213(2010); IOWA CODE § 9A.116 (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1530 (2003); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 164.6929 (West 2010); MD. CoDE ANN., Bus. REG. § 4-415 (West
2003); MINN. STAT. § 81A.16 (2002); MIss. CODE ANN. § 73-42-31 (2001); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 436.260 (1992); NEv. REV. STAT. § 398.490 (2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 332-J:14 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78C-100 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-15.1-15
(2003); OKIA. STAT. tit. 70, § 821.96 (2003); OR. RFv. STAT. § 702.057 (2008); 5 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 3314 (2008); R.I. GEN. LAws § 5-74.1-16 (2008); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 59-102-160 (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 59-10-16 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 497-2137 (2001); TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 2051.551 (Vernon 2004); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 15-9-116 (2001); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.225.120 (2007); W.VA. CODE § 30-39-16
(2001); and Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 33-44-113 (2005). Of the thirty-nine states that
have adopted the UAAA, only Florida, Louisiana, New York, Ohio and Wisconsin
do not provide for a cause of action against the student-athlete. See Fi-. STAT.
§ 468.451 et seq. (1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 4:420 et seq. (2003); N.Y. GEN. Bus.
§ 899 et seq. (McKinney 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4771.01 et seq. (West
2000); Wis. STAT. § 440.99 et seq. (2005). Agent legislation in California (West's
Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 18895 et seq.) and Michigan (M.C.L.A. 7 50.411e) also
does not provide for a cause of action against the student-athlete. See CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 18895 et seq. (West 2008) (noting lack of cause of action for student
athlete in California); MicH. Cowr. LAws ANN. § 750.411e (West 2004) (noting
lack of cause of action for student athlete in California).
136. For a discussion of lawsuits by agents against other agents, see infra notes
137-54 and accompanying text.
137. See Complaint and Jury Demand, Athletes Premier Int'l, Inc., v. Hendricks Sports Mgmt., LP., No.1:10cv10074, 2010 WL 890621 at *3 (D. Mass.Jan. 20,
2010) (alleging tortious interference with contract); Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent,
Wilhelmina Models, Inc. v. Fleisher and Davidoff & Malito, LLP, No. 5597, 2005
WL 55455570 at *3 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 2, 2005) (alleging, inter alia, tortious
interference with contract); Second Amended Complaint, Beverly Hills Sports
Council, Inc. v. Leventhal, No. BC303157, 2004 WL 2962171 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar.
8, 2004) (alleging unfair competition).
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which was partially reversed on appeal.' 3 8 The case became complicated when Dunn filed for bankruptcy, but this did not prevent
Dunn from establishing his own agency, Athletes First."" Dunn was
suspended by the NFLPA for eighteen months though there was
substantial speculation that he was continuing to operate as an
agent behind the scenes.14 0 Nevertheless, this suspension did not
prevented Athletes First from becoming one of the top agencies in
the NFL."''
One of the chief complaints by one agent against another involves client poaching.14 2 Client poaching violates the prohibition
on soliciting a represented player under NFLPA regulations." 3
The viability of such a claim faced a potentially serious blow in the
1999 case of Speakers of Sport, Inc. v. ProServ, Inc.144 In Speakers of
138. See Steinberg, Moorad & Dunn, Inc. v. Dunn, 136 F. App'x. 6, 9 (9th Cir.
2005) (reversing part of judgment against Dunn).
139. See Mike Wise, Pro Football; These Drafts Come and Go, and So Do Agents'
Fortunes,N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 26, 2003, at D3 (detailing Dunn's dispute with Steinberg
and subsequent bankruptcy).
140. See Mike Florio, NFLPA Looking Into Dunn's Text Messages, PROFOOTBALLTALK.COM, Dec. 10, 2007, 11:54 PM ET), http://archive.profootballtalk.com/
12-9-07throughl2-19-07.htm (detailing NFLPA investigation into Dunn); Mike
Florio, Get Out offail Free Cardfor Dunn, Branion , PROFOOTBALLTALK.COM (Nov. 6,
2007, 10:12 PM ET), http://archive.profo-otballtalk.com/11-3-07throughll-707.htm (describing addition of new agent to Athlete's First despite Dunn's
suspension).

141. See Liz Mullen, Athletes First adds another star-studded class for AFL Draft,
at 11, Jan. 25, 2010, available at http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/art-icle/64680 (listing Athlete's First signings, including Texas
quarterback Colt McCoy); SBJ's Top 20 Most Influential Sports Agents;Johnson is Tops,
Si'oRTsBUSINESSJ., Apr.20, 2004, available at http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/
index.cfm?fuseaction=sbd.main&storylD=SBD2004042-027 (ranking Dun as twentieth most influential sports agent).
142. See Bauer v. Interpublic Group of Cos., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1087
(N.D. Cal. 2003) (alleging claims for intentional interference with contract and
unfair competition). The court granted summary judgment for defendants Octagon and agent Mike Sullivan in the case brought against them by agent Frank
Bauer for tortious interference with contract and unfair competition. See id. at
1096 (discussing grant of summary judgment). The case arose in 2002 when the
NFL's #1 overall draft pick, Quarterback David Carr of Fresno State, signed a representation agreement with Bauer, but then terminated it and signed shortly thereafter with the defendants. See id. at 1088-89(describing events giving rise to case).
The court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the claim that
the defendants actually induced Carr to terminate his contract with Bauer. See id.
at 1095 (noting courts' conclusion).
143. See NFLPA Regulations, supra note 43 § 3(B) (21) (a) (prohibiting Contract Advisors from "[i]nitiating any communication, directly or indirectly, with a
player who has entered into a Standard Representation Agreement with another
Contract Advisor .... ).
144. See Speakers of Sport, Inc. v. ProServ, Inc., 178 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir.
1999) (granting ProServ summary judgment in its defense against Speakers of
Sport's tortious interference with business relationship suit).
SPORTSBUSINESSJ.
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Sport, MLB agency ProServ convinced the budding star catcher of
the Texas Rangers, Ivan Rodriguez, to fire his agents, Speakers of
Sport, and to be represented by ProServ.14 5 Part of ProServ's inducement was a promise that they would obtain $2 million to $4
million annually in endorsements for Rodriguez.146 When ProServ
failed to do so, Rodriguez fired them, signed with another agent
and eventually signed a five-year, $42 million contract with the
Rangers.14 7
Speakers sued ProServ for tortious interference with business
relationship, including inducing a breach of a contract.148 The
Northern District of Illinois granted ProServ's motion for summary
judgment and the esteemed Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit
affirmed.14 9 The eminent antitrust jurist Judge Posner stated:
There is in general nothing wrong with one sports agent
trying to take a client from another if this can be done
without precipitating a breach of contract. That is the process known as competition, which though painful, fierce,
frequently ruthless, sometimes Darwinian in its pitilessness, is the cornerstone of our highly successful economic
system. 150
Judge Posner did not think that ProServ's promise to Rodriguez was sufficiently fraudulent to rise to the level of unfair competition. 15 1 Furthermore, Judge Posner dismissed the relevance of
the MLBPA regulation forbidding misrepresentations to prospective players, stating that the rule is meant to protect players, not
145. See id. at 864 (detailing recruitment of Rodgriguez).
146. See id. (detailing ProServ's offer to Rodriguez as part of its expansion in
representing baseball players).
147. See id. (stating Rodriguez's new agent obtained five-year, $42 million contract for him with Rangers).
148. See id. at 865 (noting that Speakers could not have sued ProServ for inducing breach of contract because Rodriguez had not breached his contract,
which was terminable at will).
But Speakers did have a contract with Rodriguez, and inducing the termination of a contract, even when the termination is not a breach because
the contract is terminable at will, can still be actionable under the tort law
of Illinois, either as interference with prospective economic advantage ...
or as an interference with the contract at will itself.
Id. (citations omitted).
149. See id. at 864, 868 (affirming grant of summary judgment).
150. Id. at 865.
151. See id. at 867 ("But even if it was a promise (or a warranty), it cannot be
the basis for a finding of fraud because it was not part of a scheme to defraud
evidenced by more than the allegedly fraudulent promise itself.").
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agents. 15 2 Although Speakers may not have sought the appropriate
damages in the case (asking for the commission on the $42 million
deal that ProServ did not negotiate), the case reflects the failure of
the courts to understand the realities of the agent industry.15 3 Instead, Judge Posner championed the player's choice in picking an
agent and espoused the notion that agent competition is good for
the player.15 4
Whether cutthroat competition and the resulting unethical behavior among agents are good for the players is highly dubious.
While players may be able to shop around and find an agent willing
to provide services for a lower commission, agents who are weary of
being fired are also more likely to accept contracts that might be
below the player's maximum value to secure the commission. In
addition, Judge Posner's approach ignores the value to the player
of having proper counsel over a longer period of time.1 55 An agent
who poaches clients by offering discounts on commissions is probably not the type of agent who is going to act ethically, competently
and loyally during the representation of the athlete. Promoting the
solicitation of clients with existing representation is bad for the
agent industry, the PAs and many other involved parties. The Speakers of Sport decision serves a chilling effect on agents' attempts to
enforce ethical restraints on other agents through litigation.
C.

Sue the State and/or Federal Government

Attempts to sue either the state or federal government or any
of their agencies generally fail due to sovereign immunity, whereby
a government cannot be sued without its consent.1 56 Nevertheless,
some agents may be tempted to sue the government for its failure
to effectively enforce the respective statutes. The Federal Tort
152. See id. (holding that even if MLBPA rules established norm enforceable
by law, Speakers would not be able to invoke this because norm is not designed for
Speakers' protection).
153. See id. at 868 (holding that Speakers could not establish a damages entitlement to agent's fee on Rodriguez's contract because that contract was negotiated years after Rodriguez left Speakers, and by another agent).
154. See id. ("Allowing Speakers to prevail would hurt consumers by reducing
the vigor of competition between sports agents. The Rodriguezes of this world
would be disserved . . . ").
155. See id. (suggesting that competition between sports agents benefits
consumers).
156. See Dep't of Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 260 (1999) (holding
sovereign immunity protects federal government from suit unless it waves that protection) (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994)); see also United States v.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) ("The United States, as sovereign, is immune
from suit save as it consents to be sued.") (citations omitted).
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Claims Act ("FTCA") allows the United States government to be
sued for tort causes of action in the same manner as private individuals.15 7 The FTCA, however, grants an exception to government
agencies and employees who exercise due care or a discretionary

function, regardless of whether the discretion involved is abused.15 8
Enforcement of a statute and prosecution thereunder could be considered a discretionary function.' 5 9
Furthermore, the FTCA only imposes liability on the government where a private person would also be liable.o6 0 Even if "a person suffers money damages or other injuries as a result of the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of a government employee
acting within the scope of employment," that alone is insufficient to
sustain a claim under the FTCA.16 ' Consequently, because an
agent can not sustain a cause of action against a private individual
for failure to enforce a statute, he will be unable to sustain a cause
of action against the FTC and the federal government for failure to
enforce SPARTA.
State governments also hold sovereign immunity, limited to
the state's consent. 6 2 In addition, many states have statutes or
other laws stating that the government is not liable for any injuries
caused by the failure to enforce a law.16 3 Therefore, any suit
157. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2671-80 (West 2000).
158. See id. § 2674 ("The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest
prior to judgment or for punitive damages.").
159. See id. § 2680(a) (West 2006) (outlining exceptions to tort claims procedure). This provision notes that the FTCA does not apply to:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee
of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused ...
Id.
160. See id. § 2674 (limiting tort liability of United States to claims of "a private individual under like circumstances").
161. Id. § 2675.
162. See Gen. Servs. Comm'n v. Little-Tex Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d 591, 594
(Tex. 2001) ("Sovereign immunity, unless waived, protects the State from lawsuits
for damages."); see also Fiala v. Voight, 286 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Wis. 1980) ("[S]ince
the legislature and this court have not overturned or restricted the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, we hold the state cannot be sued without its consent.").
163. See, e.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/2-205 (West 1965) ("A public employee is not liable for an injury caused by his adoption of, or failure to adopt, an
enactment, or by his failure to enforce any law."); O'Connor v. City of N.Y., 447
N.E.2d 33, 34-35 (N.Y. 1983) (holding municipality not liable for failing to enforce
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against a state government for failure to enforce its form of the

UAAA would most likely fail.16 4
D.

Possible Bases for a Cause of Action

by an Agent Against a Union
As stated earlier, the PAs are the body best suited to monitor
agent behavior and react appropriately. The perception remains,
however, that they are doing so inadequately.16 5 While an agent's
efforts to sue the government for failure to enforce its laws are
likely to fail, there is potentially a cause of action against the PA.
1. Labor Law
Under federal labor law, a union has several duties to its members, most notably a duty of fair representation: to represent all employees within the bargaining unit, without hostile discrimination,
fairly and impartially, and in good faith. 6 6 The duty of fair representation extends to all union activities, including grievance filings
and collective bargaining negotiations.' 6 7 Agents are not members
of the bargaining unit, and consequently there is no duty of fair
representation owed to the agent.'6 8 In virtually no context outside
statute absent special relationship creating municipal duty) (citing Sanchez v. Vill.
of Liberty, 36 N.E.2d 870, 877-78 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1977)).
164. See O'Connor,477 N.E.2d at 36 ("[I]t has long been the rule in this State
that, in the absence of some special relationship creating a duty to exercise care
for the benefit of particular individuals, liability may not be imposed on a municipality for failure to enforce a statute or regulation."); Baumgardner v. Sw. Va.
Mental Health Inst., 442 S.E.2d 400, 402 (Va. 1994) ("[T]he immunity of the Commonwealth, unlike that of its employees, is absolute unless waived").
165. For a further discussion of the development of PA regulations, see supra
notes 100-24.
166. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944) (requiring
labor unions under Railway Labor Act to represent non-union and minority union
members in collective bargaining and contracting).
167. See Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1253-54 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating
union may have acted arbitrarily so as to give rise to breach of duty claim when
ignoring grievance); Sharpe v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, 941 F. Supp. 8,
10 (D.D.C. 1996) ("A suit against an employer alleging a breach of the collective
bargaining agreement and a suit against the union for breach of the union's duty
of fair representation are 'inextricably interdependent . . . ."). The Court added

that "to prevail on either claim, an employee-union member must prove a violation
of the employment contract and demonstrate the union's breach of duty." Id. (citing DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. Of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164 (1983)). See also Air
Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l. v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 77 (1991) (holding union's duty of
fair representation extends to ,negotiations).
168. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co, Chem. Div. 404 U.S. 157, 182 n. 20 (1971) (holding union is
not required to take into account interests of non-bargaining unit members when
making decisions on behalf of union members).
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professional sports or entertainment would a union member have
an agent. Thus, the union owes no duty to an agent of a union
member.
The NLRA permits anyone injured as a result of an unfair labor practice to bring suit.1 69 None of the unfair labor practices described under the NLRA, however, could foreseeably injure the
agent of a union member. 170 Ultimately, agent are unlikely to find
a plausible cause of action against a PA under federal labor law.
2.

Arbitration Law

As mentioned above, all of the PA regulations contain provisions requiring agents to consent to arbitration in any dispute with
another agent, a player as it relates to the agent's services for that
player and any other activities of the agent within the scope of the
regulations.17 1 Several agents have unsuccessfully sued the NFLPA
challenging the fairness of the arbitration procedures and alleging
wrongful conduct by the union in carrying out the arbitration process. 172 The uproar earned those agents a hearing before the Administrative and Commercial Law Subcommittee of the House
Judiciary Committee in December 2006, though nothing was
changed.17 3
169. See Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 187(b) (West 1959)
(explaining that those injured may sue). The Act states:
Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason or any
violation of subsection (a) of this section may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States subject to the limitations and provisions of
section 185 of this title without respect to the amount in controversy, or
in any other court having jurisdiction of the parties, and shall recover the
damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit.
Id.
170. See id. § 158(b) (delineating what constitutes unfair labor practices).
171. See id. § 171(b) (West 1947) (stating purpose of NLRA is to promote
voluntary arbitration to settle disputes).
172. See Poston v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n,, No. 02CV871, 2002 WL
31190142, at *3-6 (E.D.Va. Aug. 26, 2002) (declining to vacate arbitrator's opinion
because decision did not manifest evident partiality, arbitrator did not exceed authority, and arbitrator did not manifestly disregard law); Black v. Nat'l Football
League Players Ass'n, 87 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2000) (rejecting plaintiffs challenge of impartiality of arbitrator on basis that plaintiff "freely agreed to the arbitration terms contained in the regulations.").
173. See Richard T. Karcher, FundamentalFairness in Union Regulation of Sports
Agents, 40 CONN. L. REv 355, 401 (2007) ("On December 7, 2006, the Administrative and Commercial Law Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee held a
hearing to evaluate the NFLPA's arbitration process.").
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The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") 1 7 4 governs the arbitration
clauses in the PA regulations.17 5 There is a strong public policy in
American jurisprudence towards the use of arbitration, and the
FAA directs the invalidation of arbitration clauses only when they
are unconscionable under general contract law.' 76 Consequently,
any action by an agent against a PA concerning the arbitration
clause would be limited to the enforceability of the arbitration
clause and could not address the PA's potential liability for failure
to enforce its agent regulations.
3.

Agency Law

A principal-agent relationship exists where one person, the
"principal," manifests assent to another person, the "agent," establishing that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject
to the principal's control, while the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act. 77 An agency relationship requires that the
parties consent to their association with each other, which can be
shown through written or spoken words or other conduct.178
174. 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-14 (West 1954).
175. See Karcher, supranote 9, at 358 ("[T]he Federal Arbitration Act... governs the arbitration process set forth in union agent regulations.").
176. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 475 (1989) ("[Q]uestions of arbitrability in contracts subject to the
FAA [Federal Arbitration Act] must be resolved with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration."); Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 226 (1987) (holding Federal Arbitration Act establishes federal policy favoring arbitration ) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24 (1983)); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S.Ct. 852 (1984) (465 U.S. 1,
10 (1984) ("In enacting § 2 of the federal Act [Federal Arbitration Act], Congress
declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the
states to require ajudicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting
parties agreed to resolve by arbitration."); see also 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1947) (stating an arbitration clause "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.").
177. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (2006) (explaining
agency relationship). The Restatement notes that
As defined by the common law, the concept of agency posits a consensual
relationship in which one person, to one degree or another or respect or
another, acts as a representative of or otherwise acts on behalf of another
person with power to affect the legal rights and duties of the other person. The person represented has a right to control the actions of the
agent.
Id.
178. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01, cmt. d (2006) (providing
basic definition of agency); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.03 (2006) (explaining what type of conduct can signal association between player and agent).
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Therefore, an agency relationship can be created by a contract, so
long as all the elements of a principal-agent relationship exist.1 7 9
Appendix A of the NFLPA Regulations contains the Application for Certification to become an NFLPA Contract Advisor.1 80
Page 2 of the application specifically states that the Regulations
"shall constitute a contract between the NFLPA and [the agent] ."181
All of the other regulations and/or applications for certification
contain provisions in which the agent agrees to perform certain activities and refrain from others, creating a contractual relationship
between the agent and the PA.182
Furthermore, as explained earlier, a union can designate
agents to perform its duties, and through the CBA and their regulations the PAs have explicitly designated certified agents as agents of
the union for a variety of functions, most notably contract negotiations.18 3 The elements of a principal-agent relationship are present; the PA, through the certification process and regulations
assents to have agents act on its behalf subject to the PA's regulations, and the agent agrees to the regulations in contract. Therefore, a principal-agent relationship can be established either
through contract or the common law elements.
An agency relationship creates a fiduciary relationship,
whereby the agent must act in the principal's best interests as well
as on the principal's behalf.1 84 The agent has many duties to the
principal, including loyalty, care, good faith, competence and dili179. See Chemtool, Inc. v. Lubrication Technologies, Inc., 148 F.3d 742, 475
(7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that certain conduct along with contract creates
agency relationship); Barbara Oil Co. v. Kansas Gas Supply Corp., 827 P.2d 24, 26
(Kan. 1992) (defining agency as express or implied contract); Lewis v. Davis, 410
N.E.2d 1363, 1366 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (stating that agency arises out of contractual agreement between consenting parties); Esmond Mills v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 132 F.2d 753, 755 (1st Cir. 1943) (explaining that existence of
agency rests on a contract). But see Burkhalter v. Ford Motor Co., 116 S.E. 333, 337
(Ga.App. 1923) (finding that contract does not create agency relationship); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (defining what conduct creates
agency).
180. See NFLPA regulations, supra note 43 (showing contract application for
advisors).
181. Id. at A-2.
182. See NFLPA Regulations, supra note 43 (containing certification which delineates contractual relationship between agent and PA).
183. See National Labor Relations Act, supranote 100 (allowing unions to appoint agents). See also Karcher, supra note 9, at 358-59 (explaining that power to
negotiate contracts is delegated to third party agents).
184. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01, cmt. e (2006) (stating that
agency relationship creates fiduciary duty of agent as matter of law).
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gence185 An agency relationship also creates duties for the principal to the agent.186 If there is a duty created by contract, the
principal must act in accordance with the express and implied
terms of any contract between the principal and the agent. 8 7 Although the certification process and regulations create a contract
between the PA and the agent, nothing in any PA document purports to create an express duty obliging the PA to enforce the
regulations.18 8
The principal also owes a duty to the agent to deal with the
agent fairly and in good faith. 1 8 9 This duty also requires the principal to provide the agent with information about risks of physical
harm or pecuniary loss that the principal knows, has reason to
know or should know are present in the agent's work but are unknown to the agent.1 90
Agents in all sports are required to submit a detailed personal
application and agree to rigid standards of conduct while paying
thousands of dollars in fees to be licensed by the PA each year.1 9 '
The NFLPA also requires agents to have an advanced degree and
pass a written examination.19 2 Thus, the duty to enforce the regulations promulgated is logically encompassed by the PAs' duty to deal
in good faith. Additionally, a principal owes a duty to protect the
agent from foreseeable harm.' 9 3 Failure to properly enforce the
185. See id. § 8.03, cmt. d (describing agent's duty of undivided loyalty); id.
§ 8.08 (2006) (explaining agent's duty to act with care, competence and diligence
of agents in similar circumstances); id. § 8.10 (stating that agent has duty "to refrain from conduct that is likely to damage the principal's enterprise").
186. See id. §§ 8.13 - 8.15 (summarizing duties principal owes to agent).
187. See id § 8.13 (stating that principal has duty to act in accordance with
implied and express terms of contract).
188. See NFLPA Regulations, supra note 43 (describing NFL Players Association policies).
189. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.15 (stating that principal must
treat agent fairly and act in good faith).
190. See id. (explaining duty of principal to notify agent of possible physical
harm or pecuniary injury).
191. See Agent Certification FAQs, NFL Player's Association, http://
(last visited Oct.
www.nflplayers.co-m/about-us/FAQs/Agent-Certification-FAQs/
23, 2010) The NFLPA annual fee is $1,200 if you have less than 10 active players
and $1,700 if you have 10 or more. Id. (setting forth annual fee arrangements).
The NHLPA annual fee is $2,100. See ROBERT H. RUXIN WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM
DARREN HEITNER, AN ATHLETE'S GUIDE To AGENTS 230 (Shoshanna Goldberg ed.,
Jones & Bartlett Publishers 2010) (1982) (providing prospective of agents to
athlete).
192. See NFLPA Regulations, supra note 43 § 2(C) (describing league policies); Agent Certification FAQs, supra note 191 (describing requirements of NFL
agent certification).
193. See Petersen v. U.S. Reduction Co., 641 N.E.2d 845, 848 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994) (stating that principal must warn agent of unreasonable risk of harm related

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol18/iss1/1

34

Deubert: What's a Clean Agent to Do - The Case for a Cause of Action again

2011]1

WHAT'S A "CLEAN" AGENT To

Do?

35

agent regulations creates the foreseeable harm that clean agents
will suffer in their profession.
Furthermore, the principal has the duty to inform the agent of
any risks of any known pecuniary harm.19 4 If the PAs were diligently and competently enforcing their agent regulations, they
would be far more aware of the improper conduct that is believed
to be occurring on a regular basis. The duty does not require actual knowledge of potential pecuniary loss; instead, only a duty on
the principal to alert the agent about risks of which it has reason to
know is imposed.
A gift for gab is among the most important characteristics of a
successful agent. Additionally, there are few topics about which
agents like to discuss more than the alleged wrongdoings of their
competitors. The PAs and their employees are present in all situations where large numbers of agents are likely to congregate including playoff or championships games, pre-draft combines, drafts, allstar games, college all-star games and more. The discussions and
rumors occurring at these locations are more than enough to impute knowledge of potential wrongdoing on the PA and obligate
the PA to properly investigate the rumors or accusations. An
agent's most difficult task in bringing suit based on a breach of
good faith and fair dealing is in gathering reliable evidence of another agent's wrongdoing. In an ideal case, however, an agent may
be aware of misconduct that the PA does not adequately investigate
or provide warning to other agents that rise to the level of a breach
of the principal's duty to deal fairly and in good faith.
Having established a breach, an agent would have to show
damages and causation, meaning a link between the breach identified and the injury.19 5 In other words, the clean agent must show
that the PA knew or should have known about the agent misconduct and that the failure to enforce the regulations and to let other
agents know of the misconduct was a reasonably foreseeable cause
of the injury to the clean agent. The most foreseeable injury that
an agent could suffer would be the loss of commission on a player's
to agency); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Tackett, 323 N.E.2d 242, 246 (Ind. Ct. App.
1975) (explaining that principal must prevent agent from suffering harm during
prosecution of agency enterprise); Lawrence Warehouse Co. v. Twohig, 224 F.2d
493, 497 (8th Cir. 1955) (describing how principal must use care to prevent harm
coming to agent in prosecution of enterprise and must disclose facts which, if unknown, would be likely to subject agent to pecuniary loss).
194. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.15 (defining principal's duty to
disclose knowledge of pecuniary harm).
195. See id. §§ 26-29 (2005) (summarizing how plaintiff can establish breach).
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future contract as a result of having lost the client to a rival agent
because of the rival agent's misconduct. If a new contract was already offered to the clean agent's client prior to the client's departure, damage are easy to determine. If the player is a rookie, a
person could look at rookie contracts from prior drafts establish a
proper range for the alleged damages. The agent would then have
to draw a link from losing the commission to the PA's failure to
properly enforce the regulations, constituting a breach of the duty
to deal fairly and in good faith. This link is difficult but not
impossible.

IV.

CONCLUSION

There are many clean agents - far more than the average per-

son believes. These clean agents share some of the blame for the
enforcement problems because of their unwillingness to report possible violations, whether to the state bar association, the state or
federal government or their PA. Agents are fearful of being perceived as whistle-blowers and trouble-makers in the eyes of current
and prospective clients. More than a handful of student-athletes
have broken NCAA regulations in their dealings with agents and
they generally do not want to attract attention to themselves or

their former institutions.19 6
In addition, agents could help create a fairer system by putting
away their silver tongues and collaborating with one another.
Agents in the NFL were effective in organizing a united front that
prevented their allowable commissions from being dropped to two
percent (2%) from three percent (3%) in 2005.197 Agents, albeit
an eternally unpopular group, could collectively and effectively
lobby the PAs, the NCAA, the government and any other body that
would listen for more effective enforcement of the rules and laws
that apply to the agent industry.

An agent who can clear the many costly administrative and regulatory hurdles is deserving of competing on a level playing field.
196. For a further discussion of student-athletes violating NCAA regulations,
see supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
197. See Davis, supra note 8, at n.266 (citing Liz Mullen, NFLPA Looks at Cutting Agent Fees, SPORTS Bus. J., May 30, 2005, at 4, available at http://www.sports
busines-sjournal.com/article/45 4 82); Rick Karcher, To Cure Agent Misdeeds, Cut
Their Fees, SPORTS Bus.J., Aug. 8, 2005, at 20, available at http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/46479 (stating that NFLPA allows agents to earn 3% commission); Mike Florio, Storm Brewing Between NFLPA, Agents, PROFOOTBALLTALK.COM
(Sept. 28, 2005, 1:39 PM EDT), http://archive.profootballtalk.com/9-16-05
through9-30-05.htm (explaining issues involved in discussions leading to 2005
agreement).
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The lack of enforcement has made such an environment exceedingly difficult, often leaving an agent to choose between ethics and
clients. Clean agents must take action, first by complying with all
reporting requirements and secondly by taking steps to force the
hands of the regulators. Litigation is the costliest and most preferably avoided measure, but an agent who wishes to continue to work
in the athlete-representation industry may find litigation as a necessary means.
A lawsuit against the PAs seems to have the best chance for
success, although former MLBPA Executive Director Donald Fehr's
comments in defending such a suit are noteworthy. At the 2009
Sports Lawyers Association Conference, during the same Agent
Regulation panel that Len Elmore questioned the role of athletes
in agent scandals, Mr. Fehr unequivocally stated that if any agent
were to sue a PA, the PA would immediately eliminate all agents
and resort to its status as the exclusive representative of the players
under §9(a) of the NLRA.' 9 8 If a PA ever desired to handle all
contract negotiations for a player, as is a PA's right under federal
labor law, the PA would certainly require a massive increase in
human resources, resources that perhaps would be better used to
investigate and enforce the existing agent regulations.
198. See Donald Fehr, Response to a Question, Ethics - Agent Regulation,
Sports Lawyers Association Annual Conference, Chi., IL (May 15, 2009) (stating
Fehr's belief that agent's have no basis to sue). Conference Brochure available at
www.sportslaw.org > Conference Info > 2009 Annual Conference. Mr. Fehr was
the Executive Director and General Counsel for the MLBPA. See Donald M. Fehr,
Executive Director, MLBPLAYERS.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/bios/fehrjsp (last
visited Oct. 23, 2010) (explaining role of Fehr).
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